Given an assignment market, we introduce a set of vectors, one for each possible ordering on the player set, which we name the maxpayoff vectors. Each one of these vectors is obtained recursively only making use of the assignment matrix. Those max-payoff vectors that are efficient turn up to give the extreme core allocations of the market. When the assignment market has large core (that is to say, the assignment matrix is dominant diagonal and doubly dominant diagonal) all the max-payoff vectors are extreme core allocations.
Introduction
The assignment game (Shapley and Shubik, 1972 ) is a cooperative model for a two-sided market where side payments are allowed. In this market a product that comes in indivisible units is exchanged for money, and each participant either supplies or demands exactly one unit. The units need not be alike and the same unit may have different values for different participants.
From these valuations, a matrix can be written which reflects the profit that can be obtained by each buyer-seller pair if they trade. Shapley and Shubik prove that the core of the assignment game is nonempty, and has a lattice structure.
The first analysis of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game is due to Balinsky and Gale (1987) . There, they show how to check, by means of the connectedness of a graph, whether a core allocation is an extreme point. Also, attainable upper and lower bounds for the number of extreme core allocations are provided. After that, Hamers et al. (2002) prove that every extreme core allocation of an assignment game is a marginal worth vector, although not all marginal worth vectors are in the core of the assignment game, since these games are not convex in general.
In Núñez and Rafels (2003) we characterize the set of extreme core allocations of the assignment game as the set of reduced marginal worth vectors. The reduced marginal worth vectors are inspired in the classical marginal worth vectors with the difference that, for a fixed permutation on the player set, a reduction of the game is performed before each player is paid her marginal contribution to her set of predecessors. Moreover, for convex games, reduced marginal worth vectors coincide with the marginal worth vectors, and thus this characterization provides a unified approach to the class of convex games and the class of assignment games with regard to the extreme core allocations.
However, to compute a reduced marginal worth vector of an assignment game is quite cumbersome, since before determining the payoff to each agent we must reduce the game by the procedure due to Davis and Maschler. In our paper we present the set of max-payoff vectors, also one for each possible ordering of the set of agents. For a fixed ordering on the player set, the corresponding max-payoff vector is obtained recursively, only making use of the assignment matrix. It turns up that every extreme core allocation of the assignment game is a max-payoff vector. In fact, the set of extreme core allocations of the assignment game coincides with the subset of max-payoff vectors that are efficient. Only when the assignment matrix has dominant diagonal and doubly dominant diagonal, the whole set of max-payoff vectors coincides with the set of extreme core allocations of the market. The definition of dominant diagonal and doubly dominant diagonal assignment matrix is due to Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) , and these two properties together characterize those assignment games with large core (and those assignment game which are exact).
In Section 2, notations and the main known facts related to the assign-ment game are recalled. In Section 3 we introduce the set of max-payoff vectors of an assignment game and prove it contains the set of extreme core allocations. In fact the extreme core allocations of an assignment game are those max-payoff vectors which are efficient. The particular case of assignment games with a matrix that is dominant diagonal and doubly dominant diagonal is analyzed in Section 4.
The assignment game
Let us consider a two-sided market with a finite set of buyers M of cardinality |M | = m and a finite set of sellers M of cardinality |M | = m , and let A = (a ij ) (i,j)∈M ×M be a nonnegative matrix where a ij represents the profit obtained by the mixed-
The assignment problem (M, M , A) consists in looking for an optimal matching between the two sides of the market.
We denote the set of matchings between M and M by M(M, M ) . Moreover, we say a buyer i ∈ M is not assigned by µ if (i, j) ∈ µ for all j ∈ M (and similarly for sellers). 
Notice that a coalition formed only by sellers or only by buyers has worth zero.
Shapley and Shubik proved that the core, C(w A ) , of the assignment game (M ∪ M , w A ) is nonempty and can be represented in terms of any optimal matching µ of (M, M , A) . Once fixed any such optimal matching,
Moreover, the core has a lattice structure with two special extreme points: the buyers-optimal core allocation, (u, v) , where each buyer attains his maximum core payoff, and the sellers-optimal core allocation, (u, v) , where each seller does.
From Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983) we know that the maximum core payoff of any player coincides with his or her marginal contribution:
(1)
, and taking into account that
, we get that the minimum core payoff of a buyer i which is matched by µ is
while u i = 0 if i is not assigned by µ . Similarly the minimum core payoff of a seller j which is matched by µ is
The two aforementioned extreme core allocations of the assignment game are not, in general, the only ones. We will denote by Ext(C(w A )) the set of extreme points of the core of (M ∪ M , w A ) .
By adding null rows or columns if necessary, we will assume from now on that A is square, which means that the assignment problem has as many buyers as sellers.
Following Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) , an assignment game with as many buyers as sellers (M ∪ M , w A ) has dominant diagonal if and only if, once placed an optimal matching in the diagonal, a ii ≥ a ij for all j ∈ M and a ii ≥ a ji for all j ∈ M . As these authors point out, this is equivalent to saying that each agent has a null minimal core payoff. Since the property of having null core payoff does not depend on the optimal matching placed on the diagonal, it follows that, for all µ ∈ M * A (M, M ) , the assignment game has dominant diagonal if and only if, for all
As mentioned in the introduction, Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) introduce another important property of the assignmen matrices, namely dominant diagonal dominance. An assignment game with as many buyers as sellers (M ∪ M , w A ) has doubly dominant diagonal if and only if, once chosen an optimal matching µ ∈ M *
there exists a core allocation x ∈ C(w A ) such that x i + x j = a ij . Then, the fact that an assignment matrix is doubly dominant diagonal does not depend on the fixed optimal matching.
The two aforementioned properties together, that is to say, having dominant diagonal and doubly dominant diagonal, characterize those assignment games with large core and also those assignment games which are exact, as it is proved in Solymosi and Raghavan (2001).
The max-payoff vectors
With the aim of determining the extreme core allocations of the assignment game we introduce a set of vectors, the max-payoff vectors, one of them for each possible ordering in the set of agents. An ordering θ on N = M ∪M is a bijection from {1, 2, . . . , n} to N = M ∪ M . We then denote an ordering θ by (k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k n ) where, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} , k i = θ(i) is the agent that occupies place i . The set of predecessors of agent 
Notice that to obtain the vectors x θ (A) the characteristic function is not needed, but only the assignment matrix. When no confusion regarding the assignment matrix can arise, we simple write x θ . Once fixed and ordering, the first agent receives a null payoff and, after that, the payoff to the other agents is defined by recurrence: each agent receives the maximum profit he can obtain by trading with one of his predecessors on the opposite side of the market, after paying this partner what the vector x θ has already allocated to him.
With no restrictions on the assignment matrix, the set of max-payoff vectors, {x θ } θ∈S N , contains all the extreme core allocations of the game. That is, for every extreme core allocation it is possible to find an order θ on the player set such that the given extreme coincides with x θ .
Theorem 2 Let (M ∪ M , w A ) be an assignment game with as many buyers as sellers. Then Ext(C(w
A )) ⊆ {x θ } θ∈S N .
Proof. Take x ∈ Ext(C(w A )) and consider the tight graph G w A (x) = (V, E) with set of vertices V = M ∪ M and set of edges
E = {{i, j} | i ∈ M , j ∈ M , x i + x j = a ij } .
Such a graph can be associated to any core allocation and by Hamers et al. (2002) we know that x ∈ Ext(C(w A )) if and only if each connected component of
. We define θ(1) = k 1 and θ(2) = k 2 . We see now that, for any ordering θ on these conditions, x
To prove this, let us assume, without loss of generality, that k 1 ∈ M . It is straightforward that x
where the third equality is due to the fact that (k 1 , k 2 ) ∈ µ and x ∈ C(w A ) , and thus
Assume, by induction hypothesis, that the first 2r players in the order θ are defined, θ(l) = k l for 1 ≤ l ≤ 2r , in such a way that, for all l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2r} and odd, if
Let us prove that players in the positions 2r + 1 and 2r + 2 in the order θ can be chosen that meet the same conditions. 
Let us consider now any order θ such that θ(l) = k l for all 1 ≤ l ≤ 2r+2 and prove that x
Notice that, from x ∈ C(w A ) , we have x k 2r+1 ≥ 0 and
Thus, again by induction hypothesis,
. . , k 2r } . Since in each connected component there exists an agent whose payoff by x is zero, let us take one such agent.
(k) . We will see that, for any ordering θ such that
Since x ∈ C(w A ) and
Thus, also by induction hypothesis,
Thus, for all x ∈ Ext(C(w A )) , we have obtained an ordering θ ∈ S N such that
The converse inclusion of that proved in Theorem 2 does not hold in general. To see that, consider for instance the assignment market defined by the matrix The core is the segment with extreme points (1, 1, 1; 0, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0; 1, 1, 1). In this case the matrix has dominant diagonal but not doubly dominant diagonal, since a 12 + a 33 < a 13 + a 32 . If we take any ordering θ with buyer 1 in the first place and seller 2' in the second place, we have that x θ 1 = 0 and x θ 2 = 0 , and this can never be achieved in the core of this market.
However, if a max-payoff vector belongs to the core, it must be an extreme point. This is a property that also holds for the marginal worth vectors and the reduced marginal worth vectors in the general domain of arbitrary coalitional games.
, we can restrict to a particular set of orderings, those such that, once fixed an optimal matching µ , agents occupying an odd place in the ordering are followed by their optimal partners by µ . For µ ∈ M * A (M, M ) , let us denote by S µ N this subset of orderings on the set of agents,
Then, from Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 we can state without proof the following result.
Corollary 5 Let (M ∪M , w A ) be an assignment game with as many buyers as sellers and let µ be an optimal matching. Then,
As an application of the above result, we can obtain the extreme core allocations of the assignment game defined by matrix 1' 2' 1 2 3 4 0 2
For each ordering in S µ N , we compute the max-payoff vector and in boldface we show those max-payoff vectors that are efficient, and thus the extreme core allocations of the assignment market.
Notice that it is simpler to obtain the extreme core allocations of the assignment game by this method than by the reduced marginal worth vectors (Núñez and Rafels, 2003) . The reduced marginal worth vectors require the computation of successive reduced games, while the max-payoff vectors x θ are completely obtained from the assignment matrix. In addition to that, to obtain the set of extreme core allocations not all the orderings of the set of agents are needed, but only those orderings where, once fixed an optimal matching, each agent is either preceded or followed by his or her optimal partner. 4 The case of the assignment games with large core
We will now assume that the assignment game (M ∪ M , w A ) has dominant diagonal and doubly dominant diagonal. From Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) we know that these two properties together characterize those assignment games which have a large core. The concept of large core was introduced by Sharkey (1982) for arbitrary coalitional games and is based on the notion of aspiration. An aspiration is a payoff vector x ∈ R n that satisfies coalitional rationality but may not satisfy efficiency. Thus, an aspiration for the assignment game (M ∪ M , w A ) is x ∈ R M
